This paper attempts to resolve the apparent conflict between Descartes' commitments to the creation doctrine and the necessity of eternal truths by elaborating different conceptions of necessity in Descartes' framework. More specifically, I argue that the fact that Descartes concedes the necessity of eternal truths does not compel him to assert the impossibility of their negation. Necessity, for Descartes, rather means immutability. Descartes distinguishes two kinds of immutable truths. While truths about God's essence are absolutely immutable, truths about the essences of God's creation are conditionally immutable, i.e., they can change if God's will changes. Since there are different kinds of eternal truths, they express different kinds of necessity as well, namely conditional and absolute necessity. After I clarify these two kinds of necessity, I explain how Descartes coherently maintains both that eternal truths are necessary and that God could have created eternal truths otherwise without undermining their necessity.
In the Meditations, Descartes seems to maintain the following theses 2 : (1) God created eternal truths freely just like He created a l other creatures. (The Creation Doctrine.) (2) God could have made it possi le that eternal truths are false. (For instance, God could have made that 2+2=4 is false.) (3) Eternal truths are necessary.
There is an a parent incoherency between (1), (2), and (3). It seems that the necessity of eternal truths, which implies a condition that could not have been otherwise, conflicts with Descartes' conception of an omnipotent God who creates everything voluntarily. For instance, when we say that 2+2=4 is necessarily true, we usua ly imply that it could not ha e been otherwise. Assuming that Descartes holds a l of the theses above would be equivalent to saying that eternal truths, for Descartes, are both necessary and not necessary. One way to solve this ap arent tension in Descartes' account of eternal truths involves denying one of the theses that lead to the conflict. While some scholars deny that Descartes holds the creation doctrine, others deny the necessity of eternal truths. The objective of this paper is to show that we can find two different kinds of necessity in Descartes' writings a lowing him to maintain a l of the theses without a conflict. The structure of the paper wi l be as fo lows. First, I wi l show why the solutions offered by some scholars, which involve getting rid of the incoherency by denying either the thesis that God could have created eternal truths otherwise or the creation doctrine, do not work. Then, I wi l ar ue that when Descartes asserts the necessity of eternal truths, he attributes them conditional necessity, which should be understood in terms of the immutability that is conditional on the immutability of God' s wi l.
The creation doctrine and the eternal truths
In his letter to Mersenne, 27 May 1630, Descartes explicitly ar ues for (1) [eternal truths] (AT I 153, CSM III 25). According to Descartes, eternal truths -just as any other created things -depend on God' s wi l. They are no more necessarily attached to God' s essence. This is a consequence of God' s simple nature. Since God' s understanding is identical with His wi l -God' s understanding and wi l are only conceptua ly distinct and one is not prior to the other -, there cannot be any standard that He understands prior to His wi ling and creation (AT I 153, CSM III 26) . In other words, due to His simple nature God is not necessitated by any principles. 3 In other words, God understands, wi ls, and creates at the same time. Since God is free not to create the world at a l or to create the world completely differently, He is also free not to make the eternal truths about the essence of His creation true. In other words, (1) that 'God freely created eternal truths' entails (2) that 'God could have created eternal truths otherwise' .
However, given that the necessity of things requires that they could not have been otherwise, (2) that 'eternal truths could have been created otherwise' is in conflict with the thesis (3) that 'eternal truths are necessary' . As a way of solving this incoherency some ar ue that Descartes does not ar ue for (2). According to Jonathan Bennett (1994 (Bennett, 1994, p. 644) .
To put it differently, for Bennett, Descartes cannot be ar uing for the thesis (2) that 'God could have created eternal truths otherwise' because it contradicts his view that God AQUINAS, T. 1964 -1981 For a detailed elaboration of this point see Walski (2003) .
brings about things we clearly perceive and we cannot grasp how eternal truths could have been false. Bennett claims that rather than making a positive assertion about God's doings, Descartes merely advises us to su end our judgments on God's capacities. Moreover, for Bennett, we should consider Descartes' claims about the modal status of eternal truths as assertions regarding the limits of our understanding in terms of their conceivability or inconceivability (Bennett, 1994, p. 656) . Asserting that God could have made eternal truths false, for Bennett, means that we can make sense of something of which we cannot make sense (Bennett, 1994, p. 658 In other words, even though we cannot grasp or concei e how powerful God rea ly is and how He is the author of the eternal truths, we can nonetheless know that He is omnipotent and that He created the eternal truths just as He created other things. Accordingly, although we cannot grasp how contradictories, i.e., logical, physical, geometrical and metaphysical impossibilities, could have been possi le, we can nonetheless know that God could have made them possi le. It seems, therefore, that Bennett's interpretation overlooks this significant distinction that Descartes makes between grasping how something is the case and knowing that something is the case. Hence, the answer to the question whether we can assert that God could have created eternal truths otherwise lies in noticing this distinction as it a lows Descartes to demarcate the issues on which we can make positive judgments from the ones on which we should su end judgment. Since Bennett ignores the significance of this distinction, he attributes a rather conservative position to Descartes, according to which we should and cannot make any positive assertions about the free creation of eternal truths.
So far, I have ar ued that Descartes maintains (1) that 'God freely created the eternal truths' and that (1) entails (2) 'eternal truths could have been otherwise' . Hence, we cannot resolve the initial incoherence in Descartes' commitments about eternal truths by rejecting either (1) or (2) as the textual evidence is strong enough to hold that Descartes holds (1) and consequently (2). Some ar ue that if Descartes wants to have a coherent view he has to abandon (3) i.e., 'eternal truths are necessary' because necessity implies that eternal truths could not have been otherwise. Next, I wi l examine whether Descartes maintains that eternal truths are in fact necessary and what Descartes means by necessity.
Necessity of eternal truths
Har y Frankfurt agrees that, for Descartes, God could have created eternal truths otherwise. Yet, he denies that eternal truths, for Descartes, are inherently necessary.
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According to Frankfurt, Cartesian eternal truths are 'inherently contingent' because God could have created them otherwise and could have made them false (Frankfurt, 1977, p. 42) . He ar ues further that the necessity that is attached to eternal truths derives from the constitution of our minds. (Frankfurt, 1977, p. 45) .
In other words, as a way of solving the ap arent incoherency in Descartes' views on the creation doctrine and eternal truths, Frankfurt simply denies that eternal truths are necessary. On his account, the necessity of eternal truths is nothing but the necessity of human mind, to which we cannot help but assent (Frankfurt, 1977, p. 57) . Hence, according to Frankfurt, eternal truths a pea to be necessary, but there is in fact nothing 'intrinsica ly necessary' about them.
The pro lem with this interpretation, as Frankfurt himself admits, is that if there are no truly necessary propositions, it means that necessary propositions even about God's nature are merely ap arently necessary or necessary from out point of view. Thus, it might be the case that God is a deceiver, despite the fact that we cannot conceive of such a possibility. As Frankfurt puts it, (Frankfurt, 1977, p. 52) .
Since a l necessities are just necessities of our own contingent nature, it fo lows that from a logical point of view everything is possi le. Hence, even the contradictory claims regarding the nature of God, which Descartes relies on in his ar ument for the existence of the external world, are possi ly false for there is no uarantee that the proposition that God is not a deceiver cor esponds to reality. And if it is possi le that God is a deceiver, then we have no uarantee that any of our truth claims, even the ones that seem necessary to us, are in fact true.
Similarly, according to Frankfurt, in the Cartesian system science is impossi le as we l. For science is construed as an attempt to discover the objective truth about the world beyond the limitations of our cognitive powers (Frankfurt, 1977, p. 54) . If Frankfurt's interpretation is true, it also means that Descartes' whole project in the Meditations is in danger because Descartes relies on the 'truth rule' , according to which whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is true. 6 Fortunately, Frankfurt's interpretation is not the only way to get us out of the initial pro lem. That is, we do not have to deny the necessity of eternal truths in order to read Descartes' account of eternal truths consistently with the Creation Doctrine. Besides, his reading has little textual support. In fact, Descartes explicitly asserts in several passages that eternal truths are independent of the nature of our minds. For instance, in the fifth meditation, while he ta ks about the necessity of geometrical truths and the necessary existence of God, he ar ues that their necessity is independent of our minds:
When, for example, I imagine a triangle, even if perhaps no such figure exists, or has ever existed, anywhere outside my thought, there is still a determinate nature, or essence, or form of the triangle which is immutable and eternal, and not invented by me or dependent on my mind (AT VII 64; CSM II 45).

It is not that my thought makes it so [that existence and God is inseparable], or imposes any necessity on anything; on the contrary, it is the necessity of the thing itself, namely the existence of God, which determines my thinking in this respect (AT VII 67; CSM II 46).
As is clear in these passages, contra what Frankfurt suggests the necessity of our thoughts, according to Descartes, does not derive from the nature of our minds. On the contrary, since these necessities are real and independent, God uarantees that our thinking cor esponds to those necessary truths. As Descartes asserts, "First, I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capa le of being created by God so as to cor espond exactly with my understanding of it" (AT VII 78; CSM II 54, emphasis mine). Therefore, if I clearly and distinctly perceive something is the case, then I can infer that it is the case because an a l-good God would ensure that our understanding cor esponds to the reality (AT VII 70; CSM II 48).
I hope it is now clear that if Descartes had Frankfurt's conception of necessity in mind, he could never e a lish the "truth rule" , which plays a central role in Descartes' philosophy in general for it ena les him to achieve certain knowledge of countless matters whose nature is inte lectual and also corporeal (AT VII 71; CSM II 49). The identification of necessity with our subjective convictions can at most ensure us that we wi l never be aware of our particular er ors (AT VIIIA 21; CSM I 207). In brief, Frankfurt's mind-dependent necessity cannot be what Descartes had in mind.
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It seems that the common pro lem with the attempts to eliminate the ap arent incoherency in Descartes' views on the creation doctrine and eternal truths lies in the unjustified assumption that Descartes has to abandon one of the theses. While for Bennett Descartes denies the theses (1) that 'God created eternal truths freely just like He created a l other creatures' and consequently (2) that 'God could have made it possi le that eternal truths are false' , for Frankfurt he denies the thesis (3) that 'eternal truths are necessary' . As I have arued, neither Bennett nor Frankfurt's accounts are satisfactory. In the next and final section of this paper, I wi l ar ue that in order to eliminate the inconsistency we need to explore Descartes' conception of necessity. As wi l be clear, by necessity Descartes simply means immutability of eternal truths, which are dependent on the immutability of God's wi l.
Descartes' conception of necessity: Absolute and conditional necessities
Although simple and ap ealing, the contemporary notion of necessity understood as 'a condition that could not have been otherwise' does not fit we l into Descartes philosophy. He ar ues that eternal truths are necessary, and yet he also maintains that they could have been created otherwise. I wi l ar ue that the source of incoherency lies in our misconception of the Cartesian necessity rather than his commitments to the creation doctrine or the necessity of eternal truths.
8 In order to understand Descartes' conception of 6 As E.M. Curley points out, Frankfurt's interpretation both undermines Descartes' ontological argument, which presupposes the existence of true and immutable essence of things and it conflicts with Descartes' a priori method in physics. For a detailed defense of these points see Curley (1984, p. 570-576) . 7 As an alternative to Frankfurt's mind-dependent-necessity, Peter Geach proposes a world-dependent conception of necessity, according to which "the eternal truths are necessary in our world, and in giving us our mental endowments God gave us the right sort of clear and distinct ideas to see the necessity."' Geach argues that even though eternal truths are necessary, they are not necessarily necessary; God could have freely chosen to make a different sort of world, in which other things would have been necessary truths (Geach, 1973, p. 10) . However, this view is also in conflict with Descartes' views in the Principles where he argues that even if God created many worlds, there could not be any in which they failed to be observed (AT VI 43; CSM I 132; AT XI 47; CSM I). 8 Dan Kaufman (2005) also argues the necessity of eternal truths is compatible with God's omnipotence to create eternal truths otherwise. However, his account is based on the assumption that God simply did not will to create all other possibilities of contradictions. However, his view does not help us much because he assumes that possibilities are prior to God's creation of them, which contradicts the singularity and the unity of God's will, understanding, and creation.
necessity we should first examine its scholastic roots, more ecifica ly we should analyze Thomas Aquinas' account of neces ity by su position, which I ca l conditional neces ity. In this section, I wi l ar ue that, fo lowing Aquinas, Descartes assumes that there are two kinds of necessity, namely conditional and absolute neces ity.
According to Aquinas, "there are two ways in which a thing can be necessary, namely, absolutely neces ary, and necessary by su position (ST I, 110) . He ar ues that while God's wi ling things in Himself, such as His goodness and omnipotence etc., is absolute neces ity, His wi ling things apart from Himself is neces ity by su position (ST I, 111) . Hence, in order to determine whether eternal truths, i.e., truths about the essences of things, are absolutely neces ary or neces ary by su position for Aquinas, we need to determine which truths are in God and which ones are apart from Him. For Aquinas, not only truths about God's essence, but also a l eternal truths about God's creation reside in God's mind. As he states, "the nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three makes five, have eternity in the mind of God" (ST I, 99). Hence, eternal truths are absolutely necessary just as truths about God's own essence.
On the other hand, Aquinas ar ues that certain truths such as "Socrates is sitting" are neces ary by su position. In other words, such truths according to Aquinas are simply conditionally neces ary because God wi ls them to be the case, that e.g. "Socrates is sitting" and that it should not be absolute neces ity. Moreover, God's wi l does not change, therefore, even though "Socrates is sitting" is not an absolute necessity, it is conditional on the fact that God has wi led it to be the case.
Having made the distinction between absolute and conditional neces ities, it seems that Descartes also has a similar distinction in mind. According to the creation doctrine, God freely created everything including the eternal truths and everything depends on Him.
9 By eternal truths Descartes means the essences of created things (AT I 151-2; CSM III 25). According to Descartes, truths of mathematics, geometry, and truths of metaphysics and ethics are eternal truths.
10 He ar ues further that "the existence of God is the first and most eternal of a l possi le truths and the one from which alone others proceed" (AT I 150; CSM III 24). In other words, Descartes distin uishes eternal truths from the truths about God's existence (and essence), which are the first and most eternal truths of a l. 11 He ar ues that we cannot even conceive of the impossibility of truths about God's essence and existence. He writes, "I agree that there are contradictions which are so evident that we cannot put them before our minds without judging them entirely impossi le, like the one you su gest: 'that God might have brought it about that his creatures were independent of him'" (AT IV 119, CSM III 235). It is clear from this passage that Descartes wants to prevent us from making contradictory inferences about God's essence. Thus, he distin uishes truths about God's essence and existence from other eternal truths. That is why in presenting his position on eternal truths he mostly eaks of mathematical and physical truths as dependent on God's wi l and not of truths about God's essence. In this re ect, when Descartes ta ks about eternal truths we should genera ly understand truths about the essences of created things only.
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This might seem as an arbitrary limitation of eternal truths.
13 Nevertheless, the exclusion of truths regarding the essence and existence of God from the scope of eternal truths ena les Descartes to hold (2) without a contradiction to (1) and (3). Descartes' commitment to the thesis (2) that 'God could have made eternal truths false' compels him to consider the first and most eternal of a l truths as distinct and separate from the rest of eternal truths. If truths about God's essence and existence were eternal, then Descartes has to ar ue that God could have made His essence and existence otherwise as we l.
14 Yet, for Descartes, God exists necessarily and His essence is necessarily as it is. In other words, God's essence could not have been otherwise. So, by demarcating the truths about the essence or existence of God from the eternal truths about the essence of created things, Descartes consistently arues that the latter could have been created otherwise. I wi l ca l the truths regarding the existence and essence of God ab-9 Here I adopt Margaret Wilson's term 'creation doctrine' (see Wilson, 1978) . While Wilson thinks that the creation doctrine is simply the view that everything that exists depends on God's will, I use this doctrine in a more narrow sense to signify that all eternal truths depend on God's will. The reason for this qualification is that, as I will argue, the essential attributes of God do not depend on God's will in the way that the essential features of other things, i.e., eternal truths depend on it. While God freely determines the essence of everything else, His own nature is not freely determined by His will. He exists absolutely necessarily while everything else exists simply because God willed them to exist, hence their existence is merely conditionally necessary. 10 Some instances of the metaphysical eternal truths are: Nothing comes from nothing; It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time; What is done cannot be undone; He who thinks cannot but exist while he thinks, etc. (AT VIIIA 24; CSM I 209). 11 Note that God's essence and existence are identical and they are only conceptually distinct. 12 Paul Sperring distinguishes what he calls "god facts" and "other facts", and argues that the necessary truths pertaining to God's nature are of a higher order of necessity than the rest of the eternal truths. Yet, he does not present an account of the scholastic source of this distinction. Nor does he explain why the former has a higher modal status. For his account of the distinction in question, see Sperring (2005) . 13 According to Margaret Wilson, exclusion of truths about God's essence and existence form eternal truths is an arbitrary limitation. As she writes, "even if Descartes did want to limit his doctrine to the eternal truths of mathematics and physics, it is not clear how the limitation could be other than arbitrary and ad hoc" (Wilson, 1978, p. 124) . 14 Walski (2003) falsely assumes that Descartes takes truths about God's essence and existence to be instances of eternal truths and unjustifiably concludes that Descartes' views on the creation doctrine and eternal truths are incoherent.
solute neces ities for they are not only eternal but, unlike other eternal truths, could not have been otherwise. 15 Descartes distin uishes truths about God's essence from other eternal truths, i.e., truths about the essences of created things. The negation of truths about God's essence is entirely impos i le. In this regard, Descartes demarcates absolute neces ities that could not have been created otherwise from conditional neces ities, whose negation could have been true, but that God chose them to be true. Truths regarding God's nature such as "God is omnipotent" and "God is simple" are absolute necessities or, as some may want to put it, they are necessarily necessary (see Curley, 1984) .
However, unlike Aquinas, for Descartes eternal truths do not reside in God's mind. According to Descartes, eternal truths, just as other created things, are apart from God. In his letter to Mersenne, 7 May 1630, Descartes ar ues that it is certain that eternal truths are no more necessarily attached to God's essence than are other created things (AT I 152; CSM III 25). This is again a consequence of God's simple nature. Hence, contrary to Aquinas, for Descartes eternal truths, such as "2+2=4" and "Men are mortal" , are not absolutely necessary, they are merely conditional neces ities.
By conditional neces ity, what is meant is that the necessity of eternal truths is conditional on God's wi l and its immutability. Sup osing that God wi led them to be necessary, they are necessary. As Aquinas puts it, "from the very fact that nothing resists the divine wi l, it fo lows that not only those things hap en that God wi ls to hap en, but that they ha pen neces a ily o contingently acco ding to Go 's will" (ST I, 116, emphasis mine). Descartes ar ues in quite a similar manner and writes that " [truths] are immuta le and eternal, since the wi l and decree of God wi led and decreed that they should be so. Whether you think this is hard or easy to accept, it is enough for me that it is true" (AT I 380; CSM II. 261). He also gives the fo lowing examples:
For example, God did not will the creation of the world in time because he saw that it would be better this way than if he had created it from eternity; nor did he will that the three angles or a triangle should be equal to two right angles because he recognized that it could not be otherwise, and so on. On the contrary, it is because he willed to create the world in time that it is better this way than if he had created it from eternity; and it is because he willed that the three angles of a triangle should necessarily be equal to two right angles that this is true and cannot be otherwise; and so on in other cases (AT VII 432; CSM II 291, emphasis mine) .
In other words, both Aquinas and Descartes hold that God made certain things necessary and certain things contingent. In this re ect, they both assume that necessity of truths is compati le with God's wi l and the creation doctrine. Moreover, Aquinas writes that, "although God's wi ling a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by sup osition, on account of the unchangea leness of the divine wi l" (ST I, 115) . That is, conditional necessities are dependent on the immutability of God's wi l. Hence, unless God's wi l changes, they do not change either. Notice that Descartes' attitude towards the c angeability of eternal truths is quite conservative in comparison to his views regarding the free creation of eternal truths. He ar ues that eternal truths cannot c ange because their change implies change in God's wi l, which is inconceiva le.
16 This in turn indicates that the immutability of eternal truths is essential for their being eternal and necessary.
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Another indication of Descartes' resistance to making any assertion regarding the immutability of eternal truths is the lan uage he uses when refer ing to the eternal truths. While he ar ues that God could ha e created them otherwise, he never asserts that God can change them. This might be falsely interpreted as if he could chose another set of eternal truths to be true, which presup oses the existence of many sets of truths waiting for God to choose them. Yet, such reading would conflict with Descartes' commitment to the unity of God's understanding and wi l. That is, God could not have first understood different sets of truths and then wi led to create one set among many. Thus, when Descartes ar ues that God could have made eternal truths otherwise we should read him simply as aruing that God could have created different things with different essential properties that would be expressed with a different set of eternal truths. The fact that God freely chose what to create does not undermine the necessity of eternal truths because once they are created, their necessity is uaranteed by their immutability.
When Descartes ar ues that eternal truths are necessary, therefore, he simply means that they are true at a l times and their truth-value cannot change unless God's wi l changes. The ar ument for the necessity of eternal truths can be stated more forma ly as fo lows:
(1) God freely creates and determines the eternal truths, i.e., the essence of things. (2) Once created, the essence of His creation does not change, unless God's wi l changes. Having defined the necessity of eternal truths as the immutability of truths that depend on God's immuta le wi l, one might wor y that such an account does not leave any room for contingent truths. In "God's Immutability and the Necessity of Descartes's Eternal Truths", Dan Kaufman criticizes the immutability interpretation. According to Kaufman, the immutability interpretation is incor ect because it is either too weak to explain the necessity of the eternal truths or it is too strong in that it would commit Descartes to strong necessitarianism, a view that does not have any room for contingent truths.
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While Kaufman is right to demand an explicit explanation of how immutability accounts for the necessity of eternal truths, I think that his wor y can be a dressed just by defining necessity in terms of immutability and contingency in terms of mutability. While the essence of his creation cannot change unless God's nature changes, the accidental properties of objects can change under various different conditions. One possi le explanation for this is that while God wi ls the essential properties of things to be in a particular way, he merely sets limits for the accidental properties but does not decide upon how the accidental properties should be. That is, the accidental properties of objects are not sufficiently determined by the essential properties of things. In that re ect, while accidental features of God's creation are sti l dependent on God's wi l, they are not wi led in the same way that eternal truths are wi led, i.e., they are not wi led to be in a particular way. Hence, even if a l truths including the contingent truths are effects of God's immuta le wi l, this does not mean that they cannot change. Contingent facts, like I have a body or short hair, can change in time.
Contra what Kaufman ar ues, in order to account for the immutability of eternal truths, one does not need to adopt the Transfer of Immutability Principle, according to which eternal truths are immuta le because they are the creation of God's immuta le wi l. While Kaufman is right to point out that this principle leads to strong necessitarianism according to which a l truths are necessary, he is wrong to think that in order for the immutability interpretation to work it needs to ap eal to this principle. Immutability of the eternal truths does not directly derive from the fact that they are the products of God's immuta le wi l. Their immutability rather derives from the fact that God freely wi ls them to be immuta le. The fact that contingent facts also depend on God's immuta le wi l, therefore, does not mean that they should be immuta le and necessary. God does not wi l contingent facts to be immuta le. While both contingent and necessary truths are created by God's immuta le wi l, God wi ls them differently, i.e., He wi ls them to be muta le or immuta le re ectively.
By defining necessity in terms of immutability and contingency in terms of changeability of the truth-value of statements, one can therefore explain how Descartes can consistently hold that eternal truths are necessary even though God could have created them otherwise. Understanding necessity as immutability would also help us distin uish different kinds of eternal truths. It seems that Descartes a lows for a hierarchy between different kinds of eternal truths when he asserts that the existence of God is the most eternal of a l truths. Fo lowing Paul Sper ing, we should distin uish eternal truths pertaining to God's nature from the eternal truths pertaining to the essential features of God's creation. While the former are "absolutely necessary" simply because God's nature would not change and therefore those truths about God cannot change, the latter kinds of eternal truths are only "conditiona ly necessary" because their truth-value is conditional upon the mutability of God's wi l. Even if both kinds of truths are necessary and thereby immuta le, while the eternal truths about God could not have been otherwise, we can entertain the thought that the latter kind of immuta le truths could be otherwise due to the fact that they are the product of God's free wi l. Similarly, while the negation of absolute necessities, such as "God is omnipotent, " is an absolute impossibility, the negation of conditional necessities, such as "2+2=4, " is a conditional impossibility because it is conditional on the immutability of God's wi l.
Hence, while Aquinas and Descartes disagree on the modal status of eternal truths they both ar ue that the necessity of things that are apart from God is determined by God's free wi l and that their necessity depends on God's immuta le wi l. Given these pieces of evidence, it seems that by the necessity of eternal truths they merely mean the immutability of those truths. In his reply to Gassendi, Descartes explains how it is possi le that truths of geometry and metaphysics are both immuta le and eternal and yet dependent on God and ar ues that since eternal truths are always the same we can ca l them eternal. 19 Hence, according to Descartes we are justified to ca l the eternal truths 'necessary' and 'eternal' not because they are independent of God, but simply because they do not change. He ar ues that eternal truths "fo low manifestly from the mere fact that God is immuta le and that, a ing always in the same way, he always produces the same effect" (AT XI 43; CSM I 96).
Concluding remarks
In this paper, I ar ued against two influential interpretations of Descartes' view regarding the modality of eternal truths and the creation doctrine by undermining the common underlying assumption in both views, namely that the necessity of eternal truths entails that they could not have been created otherwise. If by claiming that eternal truths are necessary Descartes meant that they could not have been created otherwise, he would contradict himself, as there are many passages su gesting otherwise. Similarly, there is also textual evidence showing that he also assumes the necessity of eternal truths. Hence, the solutions offered to resolve the pro lem consist of denying either one of the theses (1) that 'God created eternal truths freely just like he created a l other creatures' , (2) that 'God could have made it possi le that eternal truths are false' or (3) 'Eternal truths are necessary. ' As I have ar ued, the necessity of eternal truths should be understood as the immutability of those truths. Thus, when Descartes claims that eternal truths are necessary he rather emphasizes their immutability instead of claiming that they could not have been otherwise. I also ar ued that the necessity of eternal truths is similar to the Thomistic conditional neces ity, according to which necessity is conditional, i.e., they are immuta le as long as God's wi l is immuta le. In this re ect, the immutability, i.e. necessity, of eternal truths is uaranteed by the immutability of God's nature. Accordingly, contingency can be understood as mutability. This interpretation does not only solve the ap arent inconsistency but also explains the fo lowing, (i) how God could freely determine which propositions should be necessary, i.e. unchangea le, and which ones should be contingent, i.e. changing in time;
(ii) how God's unified nature could have created different sets of necessary, i.e. unchangea le, truths; (iii) how Cartesian necessity as immutability is compati le with divine omnipotence; and fina ly (iv) how Descartes avoids making assertions regarding the changeability of eternal truths while he confidently ar ues that God could have created them otherwise.
